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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Debtor-Creditor Relations-Fuentes v. Shevin:
Due Process for Debtors
In most states prior to June 12, 1972,' any person could avail
himself of a statutory summary procedure known variously as "replevin, ' '2 "claim and delivery, ' 3 "detinue," 4 and "sequestration" 5 to

seize property in the hands of another by the simple expedient of alleging a right to possession and posting bond. A writ of possession would

issue, usually conditioned upon the claimant's initiating a later court
action to determine the rights of the respective parties to the property. 6

A defendant's bond provision was available in most states to enable the
defendant to recover the disputed property pending the outcome of
litigation on the issue of right to possession.7 There was, however, no

notice and no opportunity for the dispossessed party to challenge the
claimant's right to possession before seizure of the property.'

These summary prejudgment replevin statutes have had a long and
curious history. One of their ancestors was the writ of replevin, devel-

oped in England over 700 years ago to correct abuses that accompanied
the widespread use of "distress," a self-help device by means of which

a powerful creditor (usually a feudal baron) appropriated chattels of a
debtor (usually his tenant) to compel payment of a debt of money or
service. Replevin permitted the alleged debtor to recover his property

pending adjudication of the underlying dispute. The writ of replevin was
thus, at early common law, a remedy for the debtor, rather than for the
creditor. I"
'This was the date the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin was handed down. 92
S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
'See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-27 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
'See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 565.01-.11 (1947).
'See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 to -595 (1957).
'See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6840, 6844-48, 6858 (1960).
'See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-518 (1960).
'See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 514 (West 1954).
'The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, in its Amicus Curiae Brief for Fuentes
v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972), undertook a comprehensive survey of the prejudgment replevin
statutes of all the states. The results are tabulated in Appendix A of the brief. Typical replevin
procedures are described in greater detail in Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUN. L. REV. 886, 888-90 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Replevin Reconsidered].
'J. COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN 1, 22-23 (1890).
"Replevin Reconsidered 887; see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal
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Another ancient ancestor of the modern statutes was the writ of
detinue. This remedy differed from replevin in that detinue was used
where chattels were wrongfully withheld, rather than wrongfully taken. I
Further, there was no recovery of the property by the plaintiff until final
adjudication. The defendant was rather commanded to appear and show
why the property should not be delivered to the plaintiff.'
The modern replevin statutes were a merger of aspects of both
writs, providing the prejudgment recovery of the property whether alleged to have been wrongfully taken in the first instance or only wrongfully withheld. 3 The modern statutes have become a creditor's remedy, 4 used typically by a secured seller of goods summarily to recover
his merchandise upon default of payments by the purchaser.
Until recently, there had been notable absence of constitutional
challenge to these time-honored procedures. 15 But in 1969, a landmark
decision, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,6 cast considerable doubt
on the constitutionality of summary prejudgment creditors' remedies.
Sniadach involved a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute17 which permitted a general creditor to garnish the wages of anyone he claimed was
indebted to him by having summons issued pursuant to an action to
adjudicate the debt and paying a token clerk's fee and suit tax. The
Supreme Court held that in "extraordinary situations" such a procedure
might be constitutional,"8 but absent such circumstances procedural due
process was not met where one's wages were frozen without notice and
an opportunity to be heard. 9 Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate concurTest Litigation in the Legal Services Program,57 IOWA L. REv. 955, 963 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Abbott & Peters].
"Replevin Reconsidered 888.

"2 Brief for Appellant at 15, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Abbott & Peters 164.

13Brief for Appellant at 16, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Replevin Reconsidered

888.
"Abbott & Peters 963; Replevin Reconsidered 887.
"Recent Decisions, ConstitutionalLaw-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, Article Seventy-One-Prejudgment Seizure Of Chattels in a Replevin Action Without an Order by a Judge Or ofa Court of Competent JurisdictionIs Unconstiltutional, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 370 (1971), suggests two possible reasons for this singular absence of
challenge: the weight gathered from years of use and the fact that "most actions involving prejudgment seizures of chattels involved the poor who were not able to muster enough backing to fight
such a procedure." Id. at 377.
16395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7
" Wis. STAT. ANN. §§267.01-.22 (1957).
"1395 U.S. at 339.
9
1d. at 339, 342.
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ring opinion, questioned the constitutionality of even temporary deprivation of petitioner's wages without the kind of notice and hearing
"aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of

the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use. '

20

For Justice Harlan, even

temporary seizure of a property interest that "cannot be characterized
as de minimis" must be predicated on "the usual requisites of proce' 2
dural due process. '
Sniadach stressed the importance of the subject matter of the
suit-the fact that the petitioner's earnings were being subjected to

summary seizure. "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.

' 22

The

decision was thus open to differing interpretation as to whether it applied only to wage garnishment actions (or at least actions subjecting

the "necessities" of life to summary prejudgment seizure)2 3 or whether
it should be interpreted broadly to apply the requirements of procedural
due process to "the entire domain of prejudgment remedies. ' 24 The

Supreme Court's25 own reading of Sniadach was less than clear as to its
intended sweep.

20ld. at 342-43 (emphasis by the Court).
"Id. at 342.
Uld. at 340.
2For a painstaking examination of this question see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin.
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-48 (E.D. Pa. 1971). For cases limiting Sniadach narrowly to its
facts see, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Termplan v.
Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
24
Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715
(1971) (quoted with approval in Fuentes. For other cases construing Sniadach broadly see, e.g.,
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
"Two cases seemed to invoke Sniadach only for its special treatment of wages as a uniquely
important form of property interest: Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (bankrupt's accrued
vacation pay a "specialized type of property," which did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (summary prejudgment termination of welfare benefits an
unconstitutional denial of procedural due process). Other cases seemed to make the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process turn on the importance of the property interest, although
clearly extending Sniadach to interests less vital than wages. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
cited Sniadach for the proposition that state action which adjudicated "important interests" of an
individual require the safeguards of procedural due process and found that suspension of a driver's
license was state action of this nature. Id. at 539-40. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971), spoke of "the line" which divides protected and non-protected property interests and held
that reputation interests affected by the Wisconsin procedure permitting "posting" to prohibit sale
of liquor to any individual believed to be an excessive drinker fell on the protected side of the line.
Id. at 436-37.
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The scope of Sniadach was clarified, however, by the recent Supreme Court holding in Fuentes v. Shevin. 6 Fuentes and Parham v.
Cortese (decided together) held the prejudgment replevin statutes of
Florida and Pennsylvania unconstitutional as permitting repossession of
goods under a conditional sales contract without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. In Fuentes, petitioner-appellant Margarita Fuentes
had purchased a gas stove and service policy and a stereo phonograph
from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. Alleging default under the
provisions of the contract, Firestone instituted a small claims action,
concurrently obtaining a writ of replevin through which the disputed
goods were seized by the sheriff. Mrs. Fuentes then brought suit in
federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Florida
procedure under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7
The district court, in Fuentes v. Faircloth,28 followed the minority of
jurisdictions that had interpreted Sniadach as limited to its own facts.
It specifically followed the interpretation of Brunswick Corp. v. J & P,
Inc.,29 which stated that Sniadach "was a unique case involving, [sic] 'a
specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.' "I It emphasized the recovery provision of the conditional sales contract as sufficient to authorize prejudgment replevin of
a creditor's security interest without the necessity of a prior hearing.3'
The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin rejected a narrow reading
of Sniadach and instead approved the interpretation that had been
2 There the court
given that case in Randone v. Appellate Department.1
stated, "Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional
adjudication. It is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the
mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United
States Supreme Court."33
If the requirements of Sniadach were not limited to wage garnishment actions, neither were they confined to deprivations of other "specialized" forms of property. Fuentes made it clear that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. .

.

. It is not the

2'92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
2Id. at 1989.
2317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
'OId. at 105.
3"317 F. Supp. at 958.
"5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P. 2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
'Id. at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718, quoted, 92 S. Ct. at 1998 n.22.
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business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own
critical evaluation of [property interests] and protect only the ones that,
by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "I The Court adopted the broader
view of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach requiring effective procedural due process before deprivation of any property interest
that is not de minimis. 3s The "specialized type of property" language
of Sniadach, which had formed the nucleus of controversy among the
lower courts, was explained to be only an expression of emphasis not
intended to limit the procedural due process requirement to deprivations
of the necessities of life.3"
In reversing the lower court and holding Sniadach controlling, the
Supreme Court nevertheless restated its earlier pronouncements that
"[t]here are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing. '3 At the same time, the Court was careful
to exclude state goals of mere judicial economy or economic efficiency
as justification for such delay. 38 The Court examined some "extraordinary situations" in which it had allowed seizure of property without
tpportunity for prior hearing "to collect the internal revenue of the
United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect
against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public
from misbranded drugs and contaminated foods." 3 In each instance it
found crucial common elements:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure

an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has

kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for

determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance."
392 S. Ct. at 1999.
35395 U.S. at 342-44; see 92 S. Ct. at 1999 n.21, 2002-03.
1192 S. Ct. at 1998.
"Id. at 1999, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). See Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
1192 S. Ct. at 1999 n.22. The court in Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972), had balanced these interests of the state
in conserving its financial resources and administrative time together with the security interests of
the creditor and had found them to outweigh the buyer's right not to be deprived temporarily of
property before a hearing.
"192 S. Ct. at 2000 (citations omitted).
40Id.
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The Court denounced summary seizure "when no more than private
gain is directly at stake. The replevin of chattels, as in the present cases,
may satisfy a debt or settle a score. But state intervention in a private
dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war effort or protecting the public health."4
In addition to outright seizures, however, the Court noted cases
permitting attachment of property without prior notice and opportunity
to be heard, and observed that these cases also required an important
public interest.42 Attachment was thus classed with seizure as requiring
a "truly unusual" and "extraordinary" situation before the constitutional requirement of procedural due process could be dispensed with.
The Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan, 3 and commented that "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court" was "clearly a most
basic and important public interest."" The inclusion of Ownbey
suggests, nonetheless, approval of attachment (and by analogy, seizure)
prior to notice and hearing to serve interests that are not altogether
public. The basis for permitting such seizure is the need for a state to
protect the interests of its citizens in obligations owed them by nonresidents.45 It is readily apparent that the primary interest involved is
not that of the state but that of its citizens-private individuals. This
type of interest is easily distinguishable from the kinds of "governmental" and "general public" interests otherwise adverted to by the Court.
The Court implied that certain situations involving only private
interests may fall within the category of "extraordinary circumstances"
justifying summary prejudgment seizure of property: "There may be
cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger
that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods."4 Since Fuentes
did not present the issue, the Court did not say directly what would be
the creditor's prerogative should the statute require a showing of such
danger of destruction or concealment and should he be able to make
such a showing. In the Court's observation of what was lacking in the
statutes, however, there is the strong suggestion that if the missing
elements were supplied, the law might be acceptable. 7
41

1d.

42

1d. at 1999 n.23.
43256 U.S. 94 (1921).
1192 S. Ct. at 1999 n.23.
4
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
1192 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
7
1d. at 2000. In Sniadach, too, the Court made a similar implication when it stated that

19721

FUENTES V. SHEVIN

The case for the creditor in Fuentes was a strong one. 8 In addition

to the weight of years of unchallenged use of summary prejudgment
replevin, there were several specific factors that weighed in favor of

permitting summary seizure: (1) The creditor had retained title and had,
at the time of repossession, a substantial security interest in the mer-

chandise; (2) the dispossession was only temporary, pending litigation,
which the replevying party was required by law to initiate and prosecute

promptly;49 (3) Florida required the party invoking its replevin law to
post bond of at least double the value of the goods;" (4) the statute
provided for recovery of the property by the party replevied against

upon posting of a counterbond; 51 and (5) the conditional sales contract
under which the stove and stereo were purchased provided that the seller

at his option could repossess the goods upon default of any payment.
Each of these factors was noted and argued persuasively in the brief for
the appellee, 52 but each was answered and disposed of by the Court.

The protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment is not reserved exclusively for interests of legal ownership, but extends as well

to possessory interests.5 3 The Court noted that Mrs. Fuentes had acquired the right to possession and use of the disputed goods, which was

a property interest "sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause."54 Although this right to possession was conditioned upon

continued payment of installments toward purchase, there might have
been some defense to non-payment. But even if there were obvious
default without apparent excuse, the right to prior notice and opportungarnishment might be constitutional "in extraordinary situations [citing Ownbey, inter alia].
But
in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is
presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual
condition." 395 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added). The Court seems to suggest, though, that the only
creditor interest sufficient to remove the need for prior hearing is an interest in obtaining jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim. Id. Despite the vagueness of both Sniadach and Fuentes on this point,
it seems likely that a narrowly drawn provision limiting seizure without notice or opportunity for
hearing to those "extraordinary situations" in which it could be demonstrated to the satisfaction
of an appropriate state official that the creditor's security interests were indeed in danger of
destruction or concealment would not be found unconstitutional.
4
The following analysis refers only to the dispute between Mrs. Fuentes and Firestone.
9
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (1964).
50Id.
511d. § 78.13 (1964). "Counterbond" is the Supreme Court's term. 92 S. Ct. at 1993.
5"Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 44-5 1,Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972).
'492 S. Ct. at 1997.
541d.
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ity for a hearing would not be obviated.55 The dissent accused the majority of ignoring "the creditor's interest in preventing further use and
deterioration of the property in which he has substantial interest."" It
might be observed, however, that the creditor's security interest, like the
continued possessory interest of the purchaser, was contingent. Both
interests turned upon default of the purchaser without defense, which
could only be determined at an evidentiary hearing.
The Court noted the temporary nature of the summary dispossession under the Florida statute, but refused to draw a distinction between
permanent and "temporary, nonfinal" deprivations for purposes of procedural due process:-" "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright
lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any
significant taking of property
by the State is within the purview of the
58
Due Process Clause."
The Court quickly disposed of the appellee's argument that the
bonding requirements of Florida's replevin law, together with available
legal remedies for abuse of process, wrongful attachment, and malicious
prosecution, served to protect the replevin defendant against frivolous
dispossession by noting simply that these "less effective" safeguards
were "no substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official."" °
Not only are these deterrents uncertain,61 but "as a matter of constitutional principle," they are no substitute for the affirmative constitutional right to a prior hearing, which is "the only truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property." 2
The counterbond provision suffers as a safeguard from the same
deficiencies as the bond provision, with the additional defect that the
typical replevin defendant will seldom be able to afford it.3 The Court
55Id.
"Id. at 2005.
5
id. at 1996.
"Id. at 1997.

5

1Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 46-47, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972).
092 S. Ct. at 1996.

"The bad faith creditor can gamble that the alleged debtor will not know of the remedies
available to him, or knowing of them, will not elect to pursue them. Another real problem is that

the debtor, often impecunious, may not have the resources to pursue his remedies. Further, the
replevin plaintiff knows he will recover his bond if the defendant fails to appear to litigate, or
appearing, is unable effectively to present his defenses. See id. at 1995 n.13.
'lid. at 1996.

"For a discussion of the inequities of these bonding provisions in the context of attachment,
see Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages Must be Fixed in the Original Suit, 4 U.S.F.L.
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noted that the Wisconsin garnishment statute in Sniadachhad a similar
counterbond recovery provision,64 and yet there Justice Harlan, in his

concurring opinion, stated that the requirements of notice and hearing
were not satisfied "by the fact that relief from the garnishment may

have 65been available in the interim under less than clear circumstances."

The last major issue dealt with by the Court was the issue of
whether the replevin defendants waived their procedural due process
rights by signing the conditional sales contract providing for repossession in the event of default of payments. While agreeing that this right
could be contractually waived, the Court held that there was no such

waiver under the facts of Fuentes.66 The Court relied on its recent decision in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. ,67 which outlined the requirements for a valid contractual waiver of due process rights. In Overmyer
the Court upheld such a waiver provision but stated that if it were part

of an adhesion contract and no consideration were given for the waiver,

"other legal consequences may ensue.' '68 The suggestion by the Court
is clear that the "purported waiver provision" in Fuentes was part of a

contract of adhesion.69 Aside from the adhesion contract problem, however, the Court found that the purported waiver was not in fact a waiver,

since it provided only that the seller, upon default of payments by the
buyer, could repossess. "The contracts included nothing about the

statement of the
waiver of a prior hearing." 70 Indeed, there was no clear
71
process by which the goods would be repossessed.

The Supreme Court gave the due process clause of the fourteenth
REV. 38, 39-42 (1969). See Brief for Appellant at 22, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"92 S. Ct. at 1996 n.15.
15395 U.S. at 343.
192 S. Ct. at 2001-02.
1192 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
Id. at 783. In Overmyer, two corporations, negotiating through their respective lawyers,
executed a cognovit note. The Court found that Overmyer had "voluntarily, intelligently and
knowingly waived the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing." Id. In
invoking the standard of waiver applicable to a criminal proceeding, the Court did not impose this
standard upon cases involving only property rights but merely noted that if such standard applied,
it was met in the Overmyer case. Id. at 782. It might not be too much to speculate in this era of
concern for consumer rights, however, that the "voluntary, intelligent and knowing" standard for
waiver of constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding may be adopted for protection of property
rights. Cf.Swarb v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
1192 S. Ct. at 2002.
70
d.
711d.
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amendment a broad reading in Fuentes. It held that except in "extraordinary situations" or where there has been a valid waiver, notice and
an opportunity to be heard must precede the deprivation of any property
interest that cannot be characterized as de minimis. Even a temporary,
nonfinal deprivation of nonessential property to which the possessor has
only possessory rights is not a de minimis property interest. Although
this procedural due process right can be waived, it will admit of no
substitute. Bond and counterbond provisions and civil remedies are
"lesser safeguards" that will not suffice to replace the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment.
Following Sniadach, but before Fuentes, it was suggested that general creditor attachment would be unconstitutional, except in situations
involving purely commercial interests or where there is demonstrated
danger of destruction or concealment of the object of attachment."
Since the general creditor, unlike the seller on conditional contract, has
no specific property interest in the property to be attached, it would
seem more clear after Fuentes that summary general creditor attachment will be unable to withstand constitutional attack, at least where
the action is against a resident debtor and there is no demonstrated
73
danger of destruction or concealment of the property.
What recourse remains for the secured creditor after Fuentes?
Claim and delivery as it has been practiced is clearly no longer possible. 74 Legislative change is required for the North Carolina claim and
75
delivery statute.

"Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837, 845-49 (1970).

"Like the attachment laws of most states, the North Carolina law in this area appears to be
drawn narrowly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(4), (5) (1969). If danger of concealment or
destruction is within the "exceptional circumstance" exception of Fuentes, it would seem that this

North Carolina law is constitutional. The continuing validity of Ownbey supports the use of
attachment to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction over foreign debtors. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

I-

440.3(l)-(3) (1969).
7

Immediately after the Fuentes decisi6n was handed down, a memorandum issued from the

North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts to the North Carolina judiciary, advising that
the North Carolina claim and delivery provisions were unconstitutional. Memorandum from Taylor McMillan to Chief District Judges, June 15, 1972.
75

The North Carolina claim and delivery statute is found in N.C. GEN. STAT.

§§ 1-472 to -

484 (1969). In advance of legislative change by the General Assembly, procedure has been judicially
established for Mecklenburg County in Campbell v. Wofford, No. 72-CvD-8375 (Mecklenburg
County Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 1972), for the use of claim and delivery with appended Fuentessafeguards.
This procedure includes provision for notice and hearing before the Clerk or Assistant Clerk of
Superior Court, except where an "extraordinary situation" (defined as immediate danger to the
security interests of the plaintiff) is found by the clerk to exist, or where the clerk finds a valid
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A primary requisite for a constitutional claim and delivery statute
is a provision for notice and opportunity for hearing prior to issuance

of the claim and delivery order, except where there is a valid waiver, or
where there are "exceptional circumstances."

However, Fuentes

emphasizes that the hearing for which opportunity must be given the
defendant need not be a formal one. The scheduling, nature, and form
of the hearing may depend upon "the simplicity of the issues,""6 the
relative importance of the property interest involved, 77 and even the
apparent likelihood of the defendant's succeeding on the merits. 78 The
Court stated that "the nature and form of such prior hearings . . . are
legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject, at this
' 79
point, for legislation-not adjudication.

There may be room under Fuentes for a narrow provision permit-

ting claim and delivery prior to notice and hearing where the plaintiff
can present evidence that destruction or concealment by defendant is

likely.8 0 Presumably, the requirements for this provision are analogous
to those for a temporary restraining order, another ex parte proceeding.
harm to the plaintiff would justify the
If so, likelihood of irreparable
8
'
court.
the
of
interposition
It is emphasized by Fuentes that only an "opportunity" for hearing

is required. A hearing need not be held if the defendant, having been
given notice of his opportunity to be heard, elects not to appear to

present his defenses. 2 Accordingly, for convenience of the parties and
to conserve judicial time, provision could be made for a waiver13 of this
hearing, executed in writing before an officer of the court.8 4

contractual waiver, together with a finding of probability that the defendant "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly" made such a waiver.
1192 S. Ct. at 1998 n.18.
"Id. at 1999 n.21.
"AId. at 2002 n.33.
lid. at 2002.
"sCompare requirements for attachment in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(5) (1969).
"Cf. FED. R. COv. P. 65; N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"192 S. Ct. at 2000 n.29.
"This waiver of the right to a hearing after notice has been provided should not be confused
with a contractual waiver of the right to notice and hearing discussed below. The difficulties which
attend the latter are much less troublesome where the waiver comes after notice when the replevin
defendant is more likely to be aware of the significance of this act.
"A recent undated memorandum prepared by Roger Hendrix for Wachovia-American Credit
Corp. outlined suggested legislative action for the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly to
conform North Carolina law to the requirements of Fuentes. An appendix to this memorandum
includes a suggested waiver form.
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In addition to statutory remedy, it may be possible for a purchaser

under a conditional sales contract to waive his procedural due process

rights contractually within the bounds of Fuentes.85 However, in view

of the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights, 8 the strong
tendency of courts to refuse enforcement of terms highly disadvantageous to the weaker party in contracts of adhesion, 7 and the fact that
such a purported waiver will have been executed prior to the time when
most consumer defenses arise (making it likely that the waiver was not
made with full awareness of its consequences), 8 it seems unlikely that
such a waiver could be enforced in the typical consumer context. At the
very least, a contractual waiver would have to be clear and unequivocal,
leaving no doubt that the purchaser or borrower is agreeing not only to
return or collection per se, but also to return or collection without notice
or an opportunity to present any defenses. 8
Another creditor's remedy is self-help. However, where these acts
expressly rely upon Uniform Commercial Code sections 9-503 and 9504, their constitutionality is in dispute, as evidenced by recent conflicting U.S. District Court decisions in California.
"Cf note 75 supra, describing the Mecklenburg County procedure.
"8Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). These two cases were cited in Fuentes. 92 S. Ct. at 2001 n.31.
"See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 125, especially
cases cited at 132-34 (1962). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-302 (1971). In the context of secured sales agreements, see, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"Brief for Appellant at 28, Parham v. Cortese, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"See 92 S. Ct. at 2002.
"0 Since Fuentes is a fourteenth amendment decision, 92 S. Ct. at 1996, "state action" must
be present in any deprivation of property to which it is sought to be applied. Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970). Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), found the
necessary state action component in the implementation through private contractual agreements
of state policy embodied in §§ 9503-04 of the California Commercial Code. Id. at 617. The court
cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), as authority for its determination that mere
encouragement by state law of private acts inconsistent with constitutional mandate was sufficient
to bring those acts within the control of the fourteenth amendment. 338 F. Supp. at 617. The Code
provisions were therefore held unconstitutional, and the acts of repossession in reliance on the Code
provisions were held illegal. Id. at 622. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
reached the opposite conclusion, however, by refusing to find state action in private contracts
providing for self-help along the lines of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions. The Oilercourt
felt that Reitman, dealing as it did with racial discrimination, was not controlling in a debtorcreditor context: "The historical, legal and moral considerations fundamental to extending federal
jurisdiction to meet racial injustices are simply not present in the instant case." Id. at 23. It should
be noted that California Commercial Code § 9503 adopts the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code without change. California Commercial Code § 9504 substantially adopts the Official
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THE "QUASI-PUBLIC" FORUM

The economic impact of Fuentes has yet to be demonstrated. The

dissent expressed concern that "the availability of credit may well be

diminished or, in any event, the expense of securing it increased."9 It
seems probable, though, that the requirements of Fuentes will have
minimal effect on consumer credit. Only where the debtor is willing to

destroy or conceal the goods would the creditor's risk be appreciably

increased by the requirement of notice before seizure. And if this is
indeed an "extraordinary circumstance," then Fuentes does not preclude seizure without notice. Moreover, even where required, the ex-

pense of procedural due process need not be substantial, since informal
hearings may suffice in many cases9" and may probably be waived93 in
others. It seems probable that the prophecy of the dissent in Fuentes will

not materialize.
KENT WASHBURN

Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Shopping Centers and the
"Quasi-Public" Forum
That "freedom of speech" involves something more than a federal
and state' laissez-faire attitude toward expression is hardly a novel con-

cept.2 The Supreme Court has typically asserted that an affirmative
"maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion

. . .

is a

Text, but makes the notice provisions more specific. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN. § 9503-04 (1964).
9192 S. Ct. at 2005. This same fear was expressed by the court in Adams. 338 F. Supp. at
622. The same argument was made in support of the California summary attachment procedure
to the court in Randone-and was rejected. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555-56,
488 P.2d 13, 24-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971); see Comment, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV., supra
note 72, at 846. Collection agencies also had argued that wage garnishment was essential to the
economy, but an empirical study has indicated that "the extension of consumer credit is unrelated
to garnishment laws." Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California:A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1240 (1965).
"2 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.

'The first amendment reaches the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2
See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). Professor Barron
maintains that "[a]s a Constitutional theory for the communication of ideas, laissez-faire is manifestly irrelevant." Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1656 (1967).

